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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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British and American blood. However it can safely be assumed that
much of this Russian blood could have been saved had they followed the
British and American example and fought in the main theatre of war,,
not seeking as they did the easy triumphs in the direction of the Aegean
and Adriatic Seas. Russian propaganda merely defended the case by
stating that the * Lublin Committee * and the Soviet's extermination of
the Polish Home Forces were necessary in order to Cf protect the lines of
communications behind the Red Army/5 as if these lines had indeed
been endangered by this Polish Home Army which had begun its fight
against Germany two years before the Red Army. Repeating Soviet
propaganda in full, the British Prime Minister in his speech mingled
suggestion with fact until it was impossible for the nian-in-the-street
with his 'average knowledge of the affairs of Poland^ always of remote
interest to him in any case, to sort out the true facts of the situation.
Churchill repeated Soviet calumny about the existence of t& parties of
collaborators with the enemy " in Poland. He also repeated the inform-
ation supplied by Moscow to the effect that " the troops of the Red Army
who entered Poland were received with great joy in very great areas
in Poland." The information was in itself correct but Churchill was
careful not to inform the listeners that the population had followed the
lead of the Home Army who met the Russians prepared to co-operate
to the fullest extent. He was also careful not to inform the House of
Commons that the Russians who had come into Poland erecting gallows
and bringing an indescribable chaos and plunder in their wake, had
changed this enthusiasm to the deepest despair.

Churchill was playing at being a realist, but it was a very unconvincing
part, indeed, and one he himself found difficult to believe. His strongest
line of argument on which he could have defended himself, would have
meant splitting the Great Alliance from top to bottom. . . in the event
of Stalin passing to the attack in the Mediterranean sector Great Britain
faced disaster ! He preferred to argue in circles over territorial details,
without touching on the root of the problem, passing in silence over the
* solemn pledges * of the British andc sacred obligations * of which mention
at that time "made sick the honest people." Forestalling the expected
attack on his policy, the British Prime Minister adopted a defensive
position and pathetically thrust aside the rhetorical question as to
whether or not Poland was to be really independent and sovereign,
and not merely the " projection of the Soviet State forced against their
will by an armed minority to adopt a Communist or totalitarian system/*
Hastily avoiding a debate on such dangerous ground, he expressed com-
plete confidence that the " most solemn declaration ** made by Stalin
and the Soviet Union will be executed in its entirety and Poland would
have her " sovereignty and independence " with, however, the " single